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INTRODUCTION 
In March 2018, thousands of school-aged children organized 
the “March for Our Lives,” where they demanded stricter gun 
control across the United States in the aftermath of the Parkland 
school shooting.1 Responding to the event, retired United States 
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens argued that while the 
students’ message was commendable, it simply did not go far 
 
 1. Michael D. Shear, Students Lead Huge Rallies for Gun Control Across the U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2018, at A1. 
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enough.2 “They should demand a repeal of the Second 
Amendment,” he stated flatly.3 In support of his position, Justice 
Stevens reiterated the essence of his dissenting opinion in the 
pivotal Supreme Court case District of Columbia v. Heller—that the 
Second Amendment does not protect an individual’s right to keep 
and bear firearms.4 
To understand Justice Stevens’s opinion, we must begin with 
the text of the Second Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, which states: “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”5 Since its ratification, 
the national debate over the Amendment’s scope has been a 
veritable boxing match. Does it protect the right to use firearms 
only with respect to militia service, or does it extend past militia 
service to protect private use? 
This debate is particularly problematic when applying so-called 
originalism—determining what the Second Amendment was 
intended to mean at the time of its ratification. Although the 
Supreme Court justices agree that originalism based on the public’s 
understanding of the text at the time of ratification is the correct 
method to ascertain the Second Amendment’s scope,6 other 
questions still linger. For instance, which founding-era materials 
should be consulted? And how should those materials be 
interpreted? In sum, a simple claim of originalism analysis, even if 
there is consensus on what originalism means,7 is prone to cherry-
picking, misinterpretation, and bias. 
Perhaps the most pertinent and public example of the 
originalism debate is enshrined in the District of Columbia v. Heller 
decision Justice Stevens referenced in his New York Times opinion 
article.8 At the outset of the Heller opinion, the Court offered its own 
take on originalism: “In interpreting [the Second Amendment], we 
are guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution was written to be 
 
 2. John Paul Stevens, John Paul Stevens: Repeal the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
27, 2018, at A23. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008). 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 6. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. 
 7. See infra Part I. 
 8. Heller, 554 U.S. at 570. 
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understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their 
normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’”9 
Unsurprisingly, however, the Court still managed to come to 
radically different conclusions in its 5–4 decision, even with the same 
baseline originalist theory and the same founding–era documents.  
With the aforementioned difficulties of originalism in mind, 
this Note reexamines Heller’s Second Amendment interpretation 
via a new, data-driven method: corpus linguistics, or the study of 
language by analyzing samples of real-world language in large 
bodies of text.10 In presenting this new method, this Note covers 
four main topics. Part I explores original meaning, its difficulties, 
and how the Supreme Court has traditionally approached it. Part II 
discusses corpus linguistics: what it is, how to use it, and its 
difficulties and weaknesses. Part III implements a scientific peer 
review of a previous corpus search of the Second Amendment by 
Professor Josh Blackman and James C. Phillips, demonstrating 
corpus linguistics’ scientific features, namely repeatability and 
falsifiability.11 Lastly, Part IV discusses this Note’s corpus findings 
 
 9. Id. at 576 (alteration in original). In his dissent, Justice Stevens infers his support 
for the baseline originalist theory Justice Scalia offers in the majority (or at least he does not 
directly contradict the theory in any portion of the dissent), stating,  
I shall first explain why our decision in Miller was faithful to the text of the Second 
Amendment and the purposes revealed in its drafting history. I shall then 
comment on the postratification history of the Amendment, which makes 
abundantly clear that the Amendment should not be interpreted as limiting the 
authority of Congress to regulate the use or possession of firearms for purely 
civilian purposes. 
Id. at 640 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 10. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 
788, 795 (2018). 
 11. Philosopher of science Karl Popper introduced the concept of falsifiability, 
asserting that a statement, hypothesis, or theory is falsifiable if it has the potential to be 
contradicted. KARL R. POPPER, REALISM AND THE AIM OF SCIENCE: FROM THE POSTSCRIPT TO 
THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY xx–xxii (W. W. Bartley, III ed., 1983). And for a 
statement, hypothesis, or theory to have the potential to be contradicted, it must be 
reproducible, or repeatable. KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 66 (2002). 
Popper proposed that statements, hypotheses, and theories that are not falsifiable (and by 
extension not repeatable) are fundamentally unscientific. Id. (“We say that a theory is 
falsified only if we have accepted basic statements which contradict it []. This condition is 
necessary, but not sufficient; for we have seen that non-reproducible single occurrences are 
of no significance to science.”). 
Here, corpus linguistics offers the opportunity to inject science into the law, because it 
provides a method of reproducing a judge’s reasoning via data-driven experiments, thus 
transforming a judge’s legal reasoning into scientifically falsifiable reasoning. Currently, a 
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and applies them to the majority and dissenting opinions of  
the Heller case. 
As this Note will demonstrate in Parts III and IV, the results of 
Blackman and Phillips’ corpus search with expanded sample sizes 
overwhelmingly support Justice Stevens’s dissent in the Heller 
opinion, where four Justices found that the Second Amendment, 
based on the Court’s interpretation of originalism, does not protect 
an individual’s right to keep and bear arms. Put differently, the 
corpus search data demonstrates that Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, incorrectly interpreted the Second Amendment under the 
majority’s own proposed originalist legal theory. 
Of course, while Justice Stevens’s originalist interpretation is 
correct by virtue of the corpus linguistics analysis, such an 
interpretation stands only if the Court continues to make the 
normative decision that originalism is the best legal theory to apply 
in interpreting the Second Amendment. Such a decision will have 
sweeping effects for both the legal world and the public at large as 
the debate over gun control and the Second Amendment churns 
across the United States. 
I. DETERMINING ORIGINAL MEANING 
Originalism is a method of constitutional interpretation that 
seeks to determine the ordinary meaning of the Constitution’s text 
based on the time period in which it was written.12 Of course, this 
search for the Constitution’s ordinary meaning is deceptively 
simple on its surface. While recent scholarship shows that the 
“originalist family” of theories at least “agree[s] that the 
communicative content of the constitutional text was fixed at the 
 
judge’s reasoning cannot be contradicted unless another judge or other binding legal 
authority uses its power and its own reasoning (subject to human error and bias) to overturn. 
Furthermore, a judge’s reasoning cannot be scientifically repeated or reproduced, because 
human reasoning, being irrevocably connected to the particular individual and rife with 
uncontrollable variables, cannot be subject to scientific experiment. Corpus linguistics 
presents an opportunity to remove a judge’s reasoning from his or her individualized 
thought processes and subjects it to a controlled experiment that others can objectively 
repeat. This gives the judiciary greater power to provide clarity in and remove bias from the 
law, as will be demonstrated in the following sections. 
 12. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS, § 7, at 78 (2012) (“Words must be given the meaning they had when the text 
was adopted.”); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 204 (1980). 
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time each provision was framed and ratified,”13 originalist theories 
tend to diverge based on the language community they feel is most 
pertinent to interpreting the document, rendering interpretation of 
the Second Amendment rather messy. To illustrate, there are three 
main approaches to originalism that both scholars and judges have 
implemented in the past: public meaning, original intentions, and 
original methods. 
The first approach, public meaning originalism, deemphasizes 
the intentions of the framers, instead focuses on the general public’s 
understanding of the text in the late 1700s.14 This approach is 
designed to mitigate the difficulty of ascertaining the intentions of 
multimember conventions at the federal and state levels at the time 
the Constitution was drafted and ratified.15 Utah Supreme Court 
Justice Thomas R. Lee and scholar James C. Phillips assert that 
original public meaning is an “originalist ‘standard picture.’ It is an 
inquiry into the communicative content of provisions of the 
Constitution as they would have been understood by the public in 
the late eighteenth century.”16 As previously mentioned, this 
method is the United States Supreme Court’s preferred originalist 
method of interpreting the meaning of the Second Amendment.17 
The second approach is original intentions originalism, which 
seeks for meaning that is “fixed by . . . the framers of the text.”18 
This approach seeks to parse meaning from the framers’ personal 
writings, such as the Federalist Papers or records of the 
constitutional convention.19 Lee and Phillips argue that such 
writings and records communicate the mental states and intentions 
of the framers, which could aid in filling in areas where the 
Constitution appears to be ambiguous or have a gap in meaning.20 
 
 13. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original 
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 7 (2015). 
 14. Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data Driven Originalism, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 
268 (2019). 
 15. Solum, supra note 13, at 4. 
 16. Lee & Phillips, supra note 14 at 269. James C. Phillips, the scholar quoted here, is 
the one of the two scholars who conducted the original corpus analysis that is re-conducted 
with an expanded sample size in Parts III and IV below. 
 17. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 18. Solum, supra note 13, at 7. 
 19. Lee & Phillips, supra note 14, at 269. 
 20. See Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, 
and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1656 (2018) (“[D]rafting history can 
provide evidence of conventional semantic meaning, but this role is [only] evidential”). 
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Original intentions originalism demonstrates a parallel with 
modern day statutory interpretation, where judges begin with the 
plain meaning of the text and fill in any perceived ambiguities by 
turning to the spirit or purpose of the text, as found in areas such 
as documented legislative history.21 However, just as Justice Kagan 
asserted that “[w]e are all textualists now[,]” it is accurate to state 
that “we originalists are all public meaning originalists now,” 
because public meaning originalism has become the dominant 
theory in originalist camps.22 
The third approach in originalism is original methods 
originalism, advocated by John O. McGinnis and Michael B. 
Rappaport. Their method aims to determine original meaning by 
decoding the language of the 18th century, or “dialect,” by 
immersing oneself into the language community of the dialect.23 
This approach seeks to fill in the gaps of the constitutional text by 
“using canons and methods of interpretation that would have been 
used by lawyers and judges in the eighteenth century.”24 McGinnis 
 
 21. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 60 (2d ed. 2013) (“Over the last quarter-century, 
textualism has had an extraordinary influence on how federal courts approach questions of 
statutory interpretation. When the Court finds the text to be clear in context, it now routinely 
enforces the statute as written.”); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory 
Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 
1756–58 (2010) (showing that state supreme courts consistently give primacy to text and 
decline to look to external sources of meaning if they find the text “plain”); Chris Wallace, 
Interview with Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, FOX NEWS SUNDAY (July 29, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/Q2VH-9BCS (asserting that “[o]riginalism is sort of [a] subspecies of 
textualism”); Harvard Law School, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the 
Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://youtu.be/dpEtszFT0Tg (Justice Kagan, 
stating “[w]e are all textualists now”). 
 22. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). See Laurence H. 
Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 65, 67 
(1997) (summarizing Ronald Dworkin’s comments in the same volume); Lee & Phillips, supra 
note 14; Jonathan H. Adler, The Judiciary Committee Grills Elena Kagan, WASH. POST (June 29, 
2010, 1:18 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/29/ 
AR2010062902652.html (reporting that during her confirmation hearings, Elena Kagan 
declared, “We are all originalists”). 
 23. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New 
Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009) 
(stating that “[t]o find the original intent of the Constitution’s enactors, one must look to the 
interpretative rules that the enactors expected would be employed to understand their 
words. Similarly, to find what an informed speaker of the language would have understood 
the Constitution’s meaning to be, one must look to the interpretive rules that were 
customarily applied to such a document.”). 
 24. Lee & Phillips, supra note 14, at 271. 
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and Rappaport, the chief proponents of this theory, argue it 
“provides the most accurate method for determining the original 
meaning of the Constitution,”25 although how widespread its use 
will be within the judiciary is yet to be seen. 
Despite the competing methods of originalism, the Supreme 
Court asserts it has both currently and traditionally leaned toward 
the public meaning originalism approach in interpreting the 
Constitution, as Justice Scalia states in Heller.26 However, it is up for 
debate whether the Court’s usage of original public meaning 
originalism has answered major value judgment questions 
concerning the use of originalism or mitigated the issues regarding 
traditional sources used to determine ordinary meaning of the 
United States Constitution. 
For example, what does ordinary meaning mean? As seen by the 
theories presented above, there is not necessarily an ordinary 
meaning of the ordinary meaning of the Constitution. Furthermore, 
at what point is a term or a phrase considered ordinary? Is it when 
it reaches a possible meaning, a common meaning, the most 
frequent meaning, an exclusive meaning, or simply a prototypical 
meaning? How much of a role should context play? And how 
should modifiers change word meaning? This is all besides the 
difficulty that ordinary meaning is defeasible, which means it is 
open in principle to revision or valid objection. Ordinary meaning 
can be applied narrowly or broadly. Ordinary meaning is also 
susceptible to false consensus bias, or the assumption that one’s 
own interpretation is ordinary meaning.27 
Putting these questions and issues with ordinary meaning 
aside, the sources typically used to determine the ordinary meaning 
of the Constitution have their limits. As demonstrated in Heller, 
judges typically use three methods to glean ordinary meaning: their 
own intuition as native English speakers, dictionaries, and 
 
 25. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 23. 
 26. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (“[T]he Constitution was written to be understood by the 
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from 
technical meaning.” (citing United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931) and Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824)). 
 27. See Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales, Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal 
Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311, 1319–22, 1333 (2017). 
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“empirical research using a corpus of English.”28 Each has its own 
unique set of pros and cons. 
First, a judge’s intuition as a native English speaker on its own 
is sufficient for people to grasp the basic idea of what others are 
talking about in everyday life, but it falls short in making the 
nuanced distinctions required for legal interpretation.29 For 
example, Justice Thomas R. Lee and Professor Stephen C. 
Mouritsen offer the “no vehicles in the park” example to 
demonstrate the wide range of linguistically permissible 
definitions of the word “vehicle.”30 Even in this example, a judge’s 
intuition of the meaning of “vehicle” may diverge drastically from 
the average person’s definition of the word “vehicle.” For instance, 
does a “vehicle” include bicycles, skateboards, and shopping carts? 
Thus, this divergence necessitates a more standardized method  
of ascertaining specific meaning from legal language than  
mere intuition. 
In addition, use of a judge’s native speaker intuition also leaves 
the unwary interpreter susceptible to false consensus bias, or the 
perception that other people understand language in the exact 
same way as oneself.31 Professors Lawrence M. Solan and Tammy 
Gales illustrate this concept by explaining the results of a study of 
false consensus bias, where participants were asked to interpret the 
meaning of certain contract terms and then were asked to estimate 
how many other participants agreed with their judgment.32  
While the responses to the initial interpretation question varied,  
all participants (including participating judges) significantly 
overestimated how many other participants agreed with their 
individual interpretation of the contract terms.33 
The next commonly used method is consulting a dictionary. In 
dictionaries, there is a tendency toward a lack of semantic context, 
meaning the dictionary fails to demonstrate subtle shades in the 
 
 28. Id. at 1331. See generally Heller, 554 U.S. 570. 
 29. Solan & Gales, supra note 27, at 1332–34. 
 30. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 10, at 800. 
 31. Solan & Gales, supra note 27, at 1334. 
 32. Id. at 1333 (citing Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False 
Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268 (2008)). 
 33. Id. 
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meaning of words based on their usage.34 In addition, dictionaries 
carry the potential to have multiple senses of a term missing.35  
They also tend to favor prescriptive use over descriptive use, 
meaning they usually offer definitions based on suggested usage of 
a word, rather than merely describing the actual meaning of words 
independent of the dictionary drafter’s preferred use.36 
Furthermore, dictionaries undergo change over time as language 
evolves, rendering them the subject of sharp criticism by legal 
academics37 and even judges themselves.38 Because they lack 
proper context, it is easy for judges to cherry-pick dictionaries that 
provide the particular definitions that suit their position the best.39 
 
 34. Consider, for example, the words “last stop” and “final destination.” While the 
two technically mean the same thing, a dictionary does not typically parse out the differences 
in meaning of words based on how each is used in context. For example, “This is the last stop 
before our final destination.” 
 35. As another example (albeit a vulgar one) used frequently in today’s pop culture, 
consider the use of the word “shit.” Merriam-Webster offers a mere ten definitions of this 
term: “feces; an act of defecation; nonsense, foolishness, crap; something of little value; trivial 
and usually boastful or inaccurate talk; stuff; any of several intoxicating or narcotic drugs; 
damn; a worthless, offensive, or detestable person; or used as an interjection or used as an 
intensive usually with the.” Shit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/shit). However, pop culture continuously adds new senses to the word which 
may be missing in dictionaries, usually by adding articles, adjectives, and other modifiers. 
See ISMO, I Didn’t Know Sh*t, YOUTUBE (Feb. 23, 2018), https://youtu.be/igh9iO5BxBo (“So 
important, the article. Like, if I ‘give shit’ to you, that means I am ‘telling you off.’ But if I 
‘give a shit,’ then ‘I care.’”). Such changes in meaning can be heavily reliant on semantic 
context, which is also generally missing in dictionaries. See supra note 34. 
 36. To illustrate, Merriam-Webster does not expressly offer in its entry an explanation 
as to why the definitions of “shit” are listed in their particular order, i.e. feces as the first 
prescribed definition rather than stuff or used as an interjection as the first prescribed 
definition. However, Merriam-Webster does assert that as a general rule, the “order of senses 
within [all] entr[ies] is historical.” Order of Senses, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (https:// 
www.merriam-webster.com/help/explanatory-notes/dict-definitions). Unhelpfully, it then 
adds a caveat that not every “multisense word developed from the immediately preceding 
sense.” Id. This ultimately leaves the reader to guess if the listed senses are objectively based 
on history or based on the drafter’s preferences when history is unclear. 
 37. For a review of the pertinent literature, see James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, 
Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras,  
55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 483 (2013). 
 38. For example, Judge Posner criticizes the use of dictionaries in United States v. 
Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1043–44 (7th Cir. 2012) (summarizing literature critical of judicial 
reliance on dictionaries to ascertain ordinary meaning, focusing on the gap between context-
sensitive use of words, and the acontextual nature of dictionary definitions), as does 
Associate Chief Justice Thomas R. Lee of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rasabout,  
2015 UT 72, ¶¶ 42–50, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271–73 (Lee, J., concurring). 
 39. Solan & Gales, supra note 27, at 1334. 
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II. USING CORPUS LINGUISTICS TO ASCERTAIN ORIGINAL MEANING 
With these issues in mind, some judges have begun to turn to 
the use of a corpus of English, or corpus linguistics, to mitigate the 
problems of intuition and dictionaries.40 As a brief introduction, 
corpus linguistics is an empirical approach to the study “of 
language variation and use, resulting in research findings that have 
much greater generalizability and validity than would otherwise  
be feasible.”41 Its two main goals are to (1) assess linguistic  
patterns and (2) analyze context to determine what influences  
linguistic variability.42 
A corpus (plural: corpora) is a large body of naturally occurring 
texts that is sampled to represent a particular language 
community.43 Text can be drawn from newspapers, books, academic 
journals, legal documents, and many other written sources.   
There are two types of corpora: general, which include 
language used by a “broad (often national) community”; and 
special, which “are limited to a particular genre, register, or 
dialect.”44 By entering a particular word or phrase into a corpus 
search engine, the corpus provides tools to determine frequency, 
collocation (words that naturally occur near the word or phrase), 
and context of the word or phrase.45 
 
 40. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998) (parsing through usages 
of the word “carry” found in the New York Times and U.S. News databases to understand 
whether the meaning of “carrying a firearm” includes transporting a gun in a locked glove 
compartment to a drug deal); United States v. Costello, 666 F.3d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(using a Google search to look for relative numbers of “hits” for phrases like “harboring 
fugitives” to find if a woman who allowed her boyfriend, an undocumented immigrant, to 
sleep at her apartment was guilty of “harboring an alien”); People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 
838–39 (Mich. 2016) (citing a Utah Supreme Court opinion in support of the methodology of 
corpus linguistics and relying on corpus linguistics data to buttress the court’s interpretation 
of the term “information” in a Michigan statute forbidding the use of “information” 
provided by a law enforcement officer if compelled under threat of employment sanction); 
State v. Rasabout, 2015 UT 72, ¶¶ 68–75, 356 P.3d 1258, 1278–79 (Lee, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (advancing Google search data in support of his 
interpretation of the phrase “discharge[] a firearm” in a state statute). 
 41. Douglas Biber, Corpus-Based and Corpus-Driven Analyses of Language Variation and 
Use, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 193, 193 (Bernd Heine & Heiko 
Narrog eds., 2d ed. 2012). 
 42. DOUGLAS BIBER, SUSAN CONRAD & RANDI REPPEN, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: 
INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE STRUCTURE AND USE 3 (1998). 
 43. TONY MCENERY ET AL., CORPUS-BASED LANGUAGE STUDIES: AN ADVANCED 
RESOURCE BOOK 4 (2006). 
 44. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 10, at 830–31; see also Solan & Gales, supra note 27, at 1337. 
 45. Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 10, at 831–32. 
006.WOODS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/20  9:55 PM 
1401 Corpus Linguistics and Gun Control 
 1411 
 
At minimum, corpus linguistics can provide transparency to a 
judge’s interpretation of legal language, which is not as readily 
found in other methods of statutory and constitutional 
interpretation. It does so by presenting a data-driven experiment 
that theoretically and practically can be repeated and falsified in the 
same manner as a scientific experiment. This sheds light on a 
judge’s decision-making process and removes the need for the 
judge’s native-speaker intuition or a dictionary. 
As a logistical matter, a corpus linguistics interpretation of a 
word is briefed and argued just like an interpretation based on a 
dictionary would be. The parties run their own analyses and 
perhaps share their methods as a part the discovery process. The 
judge is then free to repeat the parties’ analyses to determine which 
is more methodologically sound, run an analysis of his or her own, 
or ignore corpus linguistics altogether. 
 Of course, a new method of statutory and constitutional 
interpretation like corpus linguistics does not come without 
pushback. One criticism is that judges and lawyers are not 
proficient linguists, and therefore they should not undertake 
corpus linguistics without the requisite expertise.46 This criticism, 
however, ignores the linguistic nature of the legal profession, as 
lawyers and judges already undertake the task of resolving 
ambiguities in legal language, albeit without the tools of linguistic 
theory.47 Corpus linguistics is a readily available tool for lawyers 
and judges to improve what they are already often required to do. 
A second criticism is that it is inappropriate for judges to use 
corpus linguistics because they cannot sua sponte run their own 
experiments on the facts.48 However, this misconstrues what 
corpus linguistics empowers a judge to do. Corpus linguistics 
allows judges to analyze statutory and constitutional language, 
which is well within their power and a common judicial task. 
Conversely, corpus linguistics does not allow a judge to examine 
the adjudicative facts best left to juries.49 
A third criticism is that corpus linguistics is impractical because 
it will make expert testimony more prevalent, thus making 
 
 46. Id. at 865. 
 47. Id. at 866. 
 48. Id. at 868–71. 
 49. Id. 
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litigation costlier.50 However, because corpus linguistics is both 
new and still considered a last resort method, it is not used 
frequently enough to make costs a concern. Furthermore, corpus 
linguistics does not always require an expert to run an analysis, 
especially with a new generation of tech-savvy lawyers.51 
Criticisms aside, corpus linguistics provides an alternative 
pathway to the constitutional interpretation methods that currently 
lack standardization and transparency. In Part III below, this Note 
demonstrates the capabilities of corpus linguistics via a scientific 
peer review of Professor Josh Blackman and James C. Phillips’s 
corpus analysis of the Second Amendment as analyzed in District 
of Columbia v. Heller.52  
For optimal results in this scientific peer review, this Note 
begins the analysis by answering five normative questions: (1) Who 
is the speech community?; (2) What is the relevant time period?; (3) 
What are the relevant search terms?; (4) Which type of ordinary 
meaning applies?; and (5) What type of corpus is best used? 
Paralleling the Heller opinion, the analysis below looks for the 
original public meaning of the Second Amendment when it was 
originally drafted in 1791. It zeroes in on three terms in particular: 
keep arms, bear arms, and the right of the people. 
Both my search and Blackman and Phillips’ search are 
conducted in Brigham Young University’s Corpus of Founding Era 
American English (“COFEA”). The COFEA includes over 130 
million words from a range of sources dating from 1760-1799.53 
 
 50. Id. at 871. 
 51. Id. at 872. 
 52. See generally Josh Blackman & James C. Phillips, Corpus Linguistics and the Second 
Amendment, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/corpus-
linguistics-and-the-second-amendment/. A scientific peer review is an evaluation of the 
work of someone with similar competency. In this case, I, by virtue of my own training in 
the law and in corpus linguistics, am conducting a scholarly review of Blackman and 
Phillip’s work published in the Harvard Law Review Blog by re-conducting their corpus 
linguistics analysis. In doing so, it enables me to find out if it is possible to repeat their corpus 
results via the same methods they employed. In my analysis of their work, I will keep all 
variables the same as the original experiment with the exception of the sample size, which I 
expanded to ensure the results are statistically significant. By conducting this peer review, I 
will demonstrate corpus linguistics’ scientific features, namely that a corpus analysis is both 
repeatable and falsifiable. 
 53. BYU LAW, LAW & CORPUS LINGUISTICS, https://lawncl.byu.edu/ (last visited Dec. 
21, 2018). The majority of the texts are pulled from the National Archive Founders Online; 
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Although the COFEA is one of the most comprehensive  
databases of founding-era documents, it is still currently  
representative of only elite, white, male voices, and it has a glaring  
omission of newspapers. 
III. A PEER REVIEW OF BLACKMAN AND PHILLIPS’S CORPUS 
ANALYSIS OF HELLER 
To properly understand this corpus analysis, we must begin 
with the background facts and the reasoning found in the majority 
and dissenting opinions in District of Columbia v. Heller. Respondent 
Dick Anthony Heller was a “police officer authorized to carry a 
handgun while on duty at the Thurgood Marshall Judiciary 
Building” in Washington, D.C.54 When he applied for a certificate 
to register a firearm for personal use at home, the District refused 
to grant his application.55 Heller then filed suit with the Federal 
District Court for the District of Columbia on Second Amendment 
grounds.56 When the case finally reached the United States 
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the 
Second Amendment protects the right to private use of a firearm.57 
In his analysis, Justice Scalia states that the Court’s desired 
method for interpreting the Second Amendment is original public 
meaning originalism.58 He then uses multiple founding-era sources 
to discern the original public meaning of each portion of the phrase, 
the right of the people to keep and bear arms.59 In analyzing these 
documents, he states that the words bear arms referred to not just 
militia-related confrontation, but encompassed private usage as 
well.60 He also states that bear arms had a militia connotation only 
when followed by the preposition against.61 
 
William S. Hein & Co., HeinOnline; Text Creation Partnership (TCP) Evans Bibliography 
(University of Michigan); Elliot’s Debates; Farrand’s Records; and the U.S. Statutes-at-Large 
from the first five Congresses. 
 54. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 575–76. 
 57. Id. at 635–36. 
 58. Id. at 576. 
 59. Id. at 581–91. 
 60. Id. at 584. 
 61. Id. at 586. 
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For the phrase keep arms, Justice Scalia posits that keep arms is a 
distinct right from the right to bear arms that applied to both militia-
men and private citizens.62 And for the phrase the right of the people, 
he argues that it refers to individual rights that may be exercised 
independent of any collective action, that is, militia action.63 
Conversely, Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, proffers 
that the phrase bear arms limited the right to firearm usage to the 
militia only, in light of its “natural meaning” as ascertained from 
founding-era dictionaries.64 As for the phrases keep arms and the 
right of the people, Justice Stevens asserts that the Second 
Amendment protected keep and bear arms as a singular right for 
members of a militia, and that the right of the people refers to 
collective rights that apply only in a militia context.65 
In their COFEA analysis, Blackman and Phillips follow the 
Court’s lead and divide the phrase the right of the people to keep and 
bear arms into simply bear arms and keep arms, running their corpus 
analysis using these phrases.66 Keeping in step with their work, I 
ran an identical analysis on these phrases using Blackman and 
Phillips’s data, although with an expanded sample size to ensure 
statistical significance. I also independently ran an analysis on the 
phrase the right of the people, which is outlined below. 
A. Bear Arms Findings 
To analyze the phrase bear arms, Blackman and Phillips ran a 
corpus analysis in COFEA on every instance of the word arm or 
arms appearing within 4 words of any and all forms of the verb 
bear.67 They then evaluated a sample size of 50 concordance lines  
of the 600 lines total in the corpus search, asserting that while  
small, the sample was sufficient to accurately represent the data  
as a whole.68  
 
 62. See id. at 582, 584 (“Johnson defined ‘keep’ as, most relevantly, ‘[t]o retain; not to 
lose,’ and ‘[t]o have in custody.’ . . . [And] [a]t the time of the founding, as now, to ‘bear’ 
meant to ‘carry.’”) 
 63. Id. at 579; Blackman & Phillips, supra note 52. 
 64. Heller, 554 U.S. at 646–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Blackman & Phillips, supra note 52. 
 65. Heller, 554 U.S. at 645, 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 66. Blackman & Phillips, supra note 52. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. Blackman and Phillips do not offer any authority regarding why 50 
concordance lines is a sufficient sample size. 
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Their study found that the majority of the uses of bear arms were 
in the militia context.69 This included bear arms without the 
preposition against directly following, although those usages were 
less common.70 
The research for this Note evaluated the same data Blackman 
and Phillips used in COFEA, though with a vastly larger sample 
size. From the outset, a search for the word arm or arms within 4 
words of all forms of the verb bear indeed resulted in approximately 
600 concordance lines. From there, I analyzed over 300 of those 
concordance lines in order to achieve a 95% certainty that the data 
was accurately represented, give or take a 4% margin of error.71 
After I calculated the sample, I separated each instance into one 
of three main categories of context based on Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Heller: non-militia/private usage, militia, and 
ambiguous.72 The militia context was further subdivided into the 
usage bear arms with and without the preposition against. Instances 
that directly quoted the text of the Second Amendment were 
discarded because original meaning cannot be ascertained by 
referring to the text of the Amendment itself.73 
Within the sample, instances of bear arms in an ambiguous 
context—those that did not clearly refer to the Second 
Amendment—occurred about 2% of the time. Direct quotation of 
the Second Amendment occurred less than 1% of the time. The non-
militia/private usage context occurred about 4% of the time, with 
the militia context accounting for the remaining 93%. And finally, 
the majority of the militia context usages (61%) appeared without 
the preposition against, while 39% of usages included it. 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 








Here, the variables are N= population size; e = margin of error (percentage in decimal form); 
and z = z-score. The z-score is the number of standard deviations a given proportion is away 
from the mean. For a desired confidence level of 95%, the correct z-score to use is 1.96. As a 
rule, the smaller the margin of error, the larger the sample size must be given the same 
population. In a similar vein, the higher the desired level of confidence, the larger the sample 
size must be. 
 72.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584–586 (2008). 
 73. Blackman & Phillips, supra note 52. 
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Overall, the second round of analysis was relatively similar to 
Blackman and Phillips’s findings despite their smaller sample size. 
The main difference was the frequency of bear arms in the militia 
context absent the preposition against. Contrary to Blackman and 
Phillips’s original finding that bear arms minus the preposition 
against used in the militia context appeared less often than bear arms 
against, the usage of bear arms alone dwarfed the usage of bear arms 
against, comprising nearly two thirds of all the instances in the 
militia context.74 
B. Keep Arms Findings 
To analyze the phrase keep arms, Blackman and Phillips 
performed a search in COFEA for the word keep and its variants 
within 4 words of the terms arm or arms.75 Their search resulted in 
approximately 200 results, of which they reviewed a sample size  
of 50 instances.76 They discarded irrelevant searches, quotations  
from the Constitution, and duplicates.77 Of the remaining 18  
results, they determined that approximately 25% referred to  
non-militia/private usage, another 25% were ambiguous, and the 
final 50% referred to keeping arms in the militia.78 
In a second round of analysis, this Note analyzed the same data 
Blackman and Phillips used in COFEA, again with a vastly larger 
sample size. Like Blackman and Phillips’s data, the search for the 
word arm or arms within 4 words of any and all forms of the verb 
keep resulted in approximately 200 concordance lines. From there, I 
analyzed over 150 of those concordance lines in order to achieve a 
95% certainty that the data was accurately represented, give or take 
a 4% margin of error.79 
Just like in the bear arms analysis described above, I separated 
each instance of keep arms into one of three main categories:  
non-militia/private usage context, militia context, and ambiguous 
context. I discarded 21% of the instances at the outset because of 
 
 74. To access the peer reviewed concordance data for “bear arms,” follow this link: 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1jbx8cZmhFVVdmfkyjTgorbkzb0AurJ63vXEy9
THnDek/edit?usp=sharing. 
 75. Blackman and Phillips, supra note 52. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See supra note 71. 
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direct quotation and duplication. Of the remaining instances, 43% 
were ambiguous, 7% were non-militia/private usage, and 48% 
were in the context of a militia. 
Unlike the findings in the bear arms analysis, the larger sample 
size relative to Blackman and Phillips’s original study caused the 
numbers to skew dramatically. In the original search, Blackman 
and Phillips discarded over half of their original sample size of 50 
concordance lines, ultimately using only 18 instances, or 8%, of the 
entire corpus of findings to reach their conclusions. In contrast, 
using the larger sample size of over 150 concordance lines shrank 
the number of discarded instances to 21% instead of the original 
discarded 50%. Of the remaining concordance lines, non-
militia/private usage shrank from 25% of the findings to 
approximately 7% of the findings, ambiguous context grew from 
25% to 43%, and militia context remained more or less the same, 
going from 50% of the findings to 48%.80 
C. The Right of the People Findings 
In their research, Blackman and Phillips state the potential need 
for performing a corpus search on the phrase the right of the people 
as it appears in the Second Amendment.81 However, they do not 
perform this analysis. Rather, they reiterate the intratextualist 
arguments of Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens 
argues that the right of the people refers to collective rights that apply 
only in a militia context.82 Scalia, on the other hand, asserts that the 
right of the people refers to individual rights that may be exercised 
independent of any collective action, that is, militia action.83 
Blackman and Phillips then suggest some potential searches to 
answer the collective/individual rights problem, including a query 
on how often the phrase the right of the people was used outside of 
the Constitution to refer to collective or individual rights and  
 
 80. To access the peer reviewed concordance data for “keep arms,” follow this link: 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1uBvYkl4rYZRnngM6T7YUrE9a3FgeWp5OD75
-ImiXzLA/edit?usp=sharing. 
 81. Blackman & Phillips, supra note 52. 
 82. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 644–46 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Blackman & Phillips, supra note 52. 
 83. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579 (majority opinion); Blackman & Phillips, supra note 52. 
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a query on how often the words arm or arms were used in the 
vicinity of the word right.84 
In light of Blackman and Phillips’s observations, I completed a 
corpus analysis of the phrase the right of the people by searching it in 
the COFEA corpus and determining whether each instance referred 
to collective or individual rights when mentioned outside the text 
of the Constitution. Although there is no study to repeat or former 
findings to compare and contrast, my results provide a baseline for 
how the phrase was used. 
The phrase the right of the people was used in only 153 instances 
in the entire COFEA corpus. For this analysis, I analyzed all 153 
instances in lieu of calculating an appropriate sample size.  
I discarded any direct quotations of the Constitution, duplicates, 
and ambiguous lines.  
Next, I determined that the phrase appeared in the context of 
collective rights if it appeared with at least one of the following: (1) 
the pronouns they and/or their; (2) the mention of a large 
geographic region, such as “the right of the people of the Territory,” 
or “the right of the people of this state”; or (3) a direct reference to 
collective action, such as “to assemble and deliberate” or “to choose 
their own rulers.”85 Of the 153 instances, I discarded 35% because 
of ambiguity, direct quotation, and duplication. Of the remaining 
65%, I found 100% were used in the context of collective rights. This 
finding directly supports Justice Stevens’s interpretation of the 
phrase in Heller.86 
Perhaps the most debatable criterion I used to parse the data 
was my usage of the pronouns they and/or their. To explain, it is 
certainly possible for a plural noun (such as people) to have a plural 
pronoun (such as they/their). This might be the case regardless of 
whether the right is collective or individual. For example, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment’s search 
and seizure clause to protect individual rights, even though the text 
of the Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in 
 
 84. Blackman & Phillips, supra note 52. 
 85. To access the peer review concordance data for “the right of the people,” follow 
this link: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1uwLzkmhrx_fmrr6oLNzzldWIqva4 
zoS1IvAeu5hpN84/edit?usp=sharing. 
 86. Heller, 554 U.S. at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . . .”87 Of course, if the 
concordance lines using they and/or their are entangled in the value 
judgment debate concerning whether the lines reference collective 
or individual rights, then simplicity and clarity demand that those 
lines would be discarded as ambiguous. Even if they are discarded, 
the remaining concordance lines referring to the right of the people 
are found solely in the context of collective rights. 
Because this is a first impression of the data regarding the right 
of the people, I encourage other scholars to perform the same search 
and review the sample based on their own criterion and any 
patterns they may find in the data. 
IV. IN PEER REVIEWING BLACKMAN AND PHILLIPS’S ANALYSIS,  
THE DATA OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS JUSTICE STEVENS’S 
DISSENT IN HELLER 
The results above do not unequivocally support one position or 
the other on the militia or private usage of firearms. However, they 
do overwhelmingly favor a militia context for both bear arms and 
keep arms. Coupled with the collective rights meaning of the right of 
the people, this strongly suggests that written references to firearm 
usage in a militia-only setting were both a common and 
prototypical usage among the general public at the time the Second 
Amendment was ratified. Furthermore, while the COFEA searches 
above have their shortcomings, the data nevertheless makes an 
excellent case that the dissenting opinion in Heller was correct about 
the original meaning of the phrase. 
A. Comparing the Bear Arms Data and the Heller Opinion 
The prefatory clause of the Second Amendment first states that 
“[a] well regulated Militia . . . [is] necessary to the security of a free 
State . . . ,”followed by the phrase “the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms.”88 At minimum, this indicates that Second 
Amendment protections have at least some connection to militia 
service. Whether these protections are understood to restrict 
firearm usage to militia service only, or if it includes militia service 
 
 87. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added); Heller, 554 U.S. at 579–80 (majority opinion). 
 88. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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in addition to private usage, is where the majority and dissent in 
the Heller opinion diverge. 
In his Heller dissent, Justice Stevens utilizes founding-era 
dictionaries to argue that the natural meaning of bear arms applied 
exclusively to the militia.89 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, 
however, contends that the phrase bear arms was best understood 
as using firearms for “confrontation” and that such usage was not 
necessarily limited to militia-related confrontation.90 He reaches 
this conclusion by reviewing multiple founding-era sources, 
including founding-era dictionaries and state constitutional 
provisions, ultimately asserting that both its natural meaning and 
its eighteenth century public meaning were the same.91 He 
demonstrates that some instances of bear arms were used to 
reference private usage of firearms unconnected with militia 
service, as in the case of state constitutional provisions referencing 
the right of citizens to “bear arms in defense of themselves and the 
state” or “bear arms in defense of himself and the state.”92 He also 
contends that bear arms in the militia context was in fact an 
idiomatic meaning at the time of the founding and only occurred 
when bear arms was followed by the preposition against.93 For 
example, the Declaration of Independence makes reference to “bear 
arms” in one of its passages: “He has constrained our fellow 
Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their 
Country.”94 However, Justice Scalia acknowledges that other 
sources, such as records of congressional debate, used bear arms in 
the militia context, however “unremarkable” he personally felt 
those usages were.95 
After scientific peer review, the Blackman and Phillips data 
overwhelmingly favors Justice Stevens’s dissenting viewpoint. In 
their first set of corpus analysis, Blackman and Phillips were correct 
that the vast majority of the usage of bear arms is used in the militia 
context. Upon a second analysis, however, they were incorrect in 
stating that bear arms is used in a militia context less frequently 
 
 89. Heller, 554 U.S. at 646–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).. 
 90. Id. at 584 (majority opinion). 
 91. Id. at 584–86. 
 92. Id. at 584–92. 
 93. Id. at 586. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 587. 
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when the preposition against is missing. The data presents strong 
evidence overall that the general public likely understood the right 
to bear arms as generally synonymous with militia service. 
Of course, while overwhelming, the usage of bear arms in the 
militia context is not exclusive. While usage of bear arms in the 
militia context certainly appears prototypical for the era, the 
appearance of the non-militia/private context could very well 
mean that bear arms had more than one sense associated with it, 
frequency aside. Moreover, the corpus itself may not be perfectly 
representative of the general public’s mindset as the corpus has a 
limited set of documents to use in determining public meaning  
at the time. 
B. Comparing the Keep Arms Data and the Heller Opinion 
In comparison to the bear arms analysis, Justice Stevens posits in 
his Heller dissent that to keep arms is not a right separate from the 
right to bear arms. He stated that the Second Amendment 
“describe[s] a unitary right: to possess arms if needed for military 
purposes and to use them in conjunction with military activities.”96 
Additionally, Stevens concludes that the Second Amendment’s 
“use of the term ‘keep’ in no way contradicts the militia meaning 
conveyed by the phrase ‘bear arms’ and the Amendment’s 
preamble.”97 In support of his position, Stevens offers examples of 
state militia laws requiring militia members to store their arms in 
their homes to be ready for militia service later.98 
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, asserts in the majority opinion 
that the most natural meaning of keep arms in the Second 
Amendment is to “have weapons.”99 He also argued that while keep 
arms lacked prevalence in founding-era documents, all of the 
examples the Court reviewed found the right to keep arms was an 
individual right unconnected to militia service.100 
Applying the Blackman and Phillips data, Justice Scalia’s 
arguments appear to hold some water, as both keep arms and bear 
 
 96. Id. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id.at 650. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 582 (majority opinion). 
 100. Id. 
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arms are spoken of separately in the data set. However, the problem 
for Scalia is that both are used most often within the militia context.  
Furthermore, it is starkly untrue that all usages of keep arms in 
founding-era documents were framed as an individual right 
unconnected to militia service. In fact, in both Blackman and 
Phillips’s study and the study in this Note, approximately half of 
all usages of keep arms were in the context of militia service. 
C. Comparing The Right of the People Data  
and the Heller Opinion 
A final point Blackman and Phillips cover in their original study 
is the need to conduct a corpus analysis of the right of the people to 
determine if the Second Amendment was written in reference to 
individual rights or collective rights. Nevertheless, Blackman and 
Phillips do not conduct this analysis, choosing instead to merely 
summarize Justice Stevens and Justice Scalia’s arguments on the 
right of the people.  
In the dissent, Justice Stevens asserts that the right of the people 
refers to collective action in the Second Amendment the same way 
it does in the First Amendment (e.g. the right of “the people”  
to peaceably assemble).101 Thus, the phrase is more concerned  
with the action engaged by a group, rather than that of any  
particular individual.102 
In the majority decision, however, Justice Scalia asserts that the 
right of the people unambiguously references individual rights rather 
than collective rights “that may be exercised only through 
participation in some corporate body.”103 He does not make this 
assertion by referencing any founding-era works to determine the 
original meaning of the right of the people the way he does with keep 
arms and bear arms; instead he uses the same intratextualist method 
Justice Stevens used to ascertain its meaning by comparing and 
 
 101. Id. at 645–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Stevens concedes to 
Justice Scalia that the people as used in the Fourth Amendment refer to the exercise of 
individual rights, not collective rights. Id. at 645. However, Justice Stevens counters by 
arguing that the people as used in the Fourth Amendment does not settle what the people 
means in the Second Amendment. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 579 (majority opinion). 
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contrasting the phrase’s use in other areas of the Constitution.104 
Like Justice Stevens, he specifically mentions the phrase’s use in  
the First Amendment’s Assembly and Petition Clause and the 
Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause, demonstrating 
how the similar terminology is used in reference to the exercise of 
individual rights.105 
Rather than presenting yet another intratextualist take on the 
right of the people, my data above indicates that the right of the people 
was used exclusively in the context of collective rights, falling 
directly in step with Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion. And 
while my study presented here gives only a first-impression review 
that deserves additional study, it still provides a strong baseline for 
how the phrase was generally understood in the founding era. One 
approach my data does not look at is the use of the word right in 
context of the word arm or arms, which may produce different 
results as to whether use of firearms concerns an individual or  
a collective right. 
D. Areas of Improvement in the Analysis Overall 
While Blackman and Phillips’s study and this Note’s scientific 
peer review function to provide greater clarity to the original public 
meaning of the Second Amendment, there is room for 
improvement in some areas. First, the original study lacks data on 
collective versus individual rights, thus necessitating a scientific 
peer review of my own analysis on the right of the people provided 
in this Note. Second, the relatively manageable size of the data 
leaves room for not just a larger sample size but for review of all 
concordance lines. Third, should COFEA grow larger (e.g. with the 
addition of newspapers), a new analysis would be needed to see if 
the data changes. And finally, there are certainly some value 
judgments on whether a concordance line references militia or 
personal use of a firearm, which may slightly skew some of the 
 
 104. Blackman & Phillips, supra note 52 (stating that “[f]or purposes of a textualist 
analysis of the Second Amendment, the final relevant phrase is ‘the right of the people.’ 
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Heller attempted to use linguistic sources to interpret 
the ‘right of the people,’ standing by itself. Instead, both opinions used what Professor Akhil 
Reed Amar dubbed intratextualism in order to compare the Second Amendment’s reference 
to ‘the people’ with how that phrase is used in First and Fourth Amendments.”). 
 105. Heller, 554 U.S. at 579. 
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results. Further peer review and study can work to mitigate any  
or all of these issues. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated above, the results of Blackman and Phillips’s 
corpus search with expanded sample sizes overwhelmingly 
support Justice Stevens’s position in the Heller opinion that the 
original public meaning of the Second Amendment did not support 
the private right to use a firearm. In other words, Justice Scalia and 
the majority incorrectly interpreted the Second Amendment based 
on the original public meaning theory of originalism. 
The results of this corpus analysis, coupled with its repeatable 
and falsifiable nature, should raise a major red flag for political 
conservatives, “conservative” judges and justices, and legal 
scholars who adopt Justice Scalia’s originalist theory of 
constitutional interpretation concerning the Second Amendment.  
If the goal is to maintain Heller as legal precedent in future cases, 
the most intellectually honest thing for the United States Supreme 
Court to do is to conclude that Heller was correct in its ultimate 
judgment but incorrect in its reasoning. In addition, the Court 
should seriously reconsider its use of originalism in interpreting the 
Second Amendment generally. This reconsideration would raise 
many questions, such as whether the people of the founding era 
had a monopoly on wisdom concerning the Second Amendment’s 
meaning and whether that “wisdom” from the 1700s is still relevant 
in today’s America.106 In sum, doing away with the Court’s use of 
originalism to interpret the Second Amendment may be necessary 
to keep Heller viable. 
 
 106. The Supreme Court, however unwittingly, does indicate a certain awareness of 
these points. In his Heller analysis, Justice Scalia states,  
Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms 
in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do 
not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects 
modern forms of communication, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 
U.S. 844, 849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of 
search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States. 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001), the Second Amendment 
extents, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those 
that were not in existence at the time of the founding.  
Heller, 554 U.S. at 582. 
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With further peer review and study, not only will there be 
continued improvement on the accuracy of the data regarding the 
Second Amendment, but there will also be greater exposure to (and 
comfort with) corpus linguistics usage in the legal community and 
greater clarity in judicial opinions. To be sure, when it comes to the 
private use of firearms, an honest look at the data could make all 
the difference. 
Kyra Babcock Woods* 
  
 
*  J.D., 2020, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.  
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